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Abstract
This article examines the constitutional status of Constitutional Court’s decisions constitutionally 
guaranteed as final. This status very critical because it could lead Constitutional Court to the judicial 
supremacy position. This article argues against this possibility. The status of Constitutional Court’s 
decisions should be critized on the basis that its finality is prima facie, not absolute. As a solution, this 
article takes a position called departmentalism which means that court and legislature are not supreme in 
their authority to interpret the constitution.
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Intisari
Artikel ini membahas tentang status konstitusional putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi yang dijamin konstitusi 
bersifat final. Status tersebut sangat kritikal karena dapat mengarahkan Mahkamah Konstitusi ke posisi 
supremasi yudisial. Artikel ini berargumen tidak setuju atas kemungkinan tersebut. Oleh karena itu, status 
putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi perlu dikritisi dengan dasar bahwa finalitasnya tersebut bersifat “prima 
facie”, tidak absolut. Sebagai solusinya, artikel ini mengambil posisi departementalisme yang memiliki 
pengertian bahwa pengadilan dan legislator tidak memiliki supremasi atas kewenangan untuk melakukan 
interpretasi konstitusi.
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A. Background
Juridicaly, decisions made by Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Indonesia in regards of 
judcial review over the constitutionality of an Act 
is final.1 It is interesting to further assessed and 
reviewed the essential meaning of such decision, 
especially in regards with its finality. Final in the 
sense that there are no available legal remedies 
towards the Constitutional Court decision because 
the constitutional proceeding done by Constitutional 
Court act as the first and last instance.  
Fajar Laksono Soeroso have analyzed the 
issues on finality of Constitutional Court’s decision 
with the orientation to found its philosophical 
ground.2 Fajar Laksono Soeroso generally argue 
that Constitutional Court decision is final due to 
these reason: First, the nature of constitutional 
law as the supreme law; Second, maintaining the 
authority of constitutional judiciary; and Third, 
there is no better alternative.3 This argument can be 
classified as a formalized perspective that localized 
the status of Constitutional Court decision only as 
decision itself, and ignoring the other factors that 
are very important which is the relation between the 
Constitutional Court and the legislator (lawmakers), 
which are the House of Representative and the 
President.
In regards to the first point, the author do 
agree that what was stated in the constitution has 
been stren and explicit. Although, if the first point to 
be connected with the second point, it should not be 
interpreted that way. When the position is formally 
maintained, it could implicates judicial supremacy 
which contradicts with the main conception of post 
politic reformation 1998 with four amendments 
to our constitution, which is checks and balances. 
Therefore it can be said that the Indonesian 
Constitution 1945 have a strong commitment 
towards checks and balances, so that the judicial 
supremacy supposedly should not happened as well 
as parliament supremacy and executive supremacy. 
The only one that could exist is constitutional 
supremacy, and commitment of the constitution 
regarding checks and balances should be more 
prioritized rather than judicial supremacy. 
Thus, a school of thought will be created 
by re-interpreting the status of the finality of the 
Constitutional Court’s decision to re-design the 
understanding in regards to the meaning of the 
finality in the judicial review of an Act. This is based 
on a main argument that the 1945 Constitution 
only recognize constitutional supremacy, not 
judicial supremacy. Solution that offered is 
departementalism. Based on such position the 
author will further argue that the finality of the 
Constitutional Court decision is prima facie, even 
relatively. In terms of the commitment towards 
checks and balances there will be an opportunity 
for the legislator or lawmaker to legitimately 
re-interpret the Constitutional Court decision, 
including to reject the decision through overrides. 
This problems will be highly relevant in the present 
day public discussion regarding attempt to re-
criminalize defamation of the President in which 
within the Constitutional Court decision elements 
of defamation towards the President in Indonesian 
Penal Code has been decided to be incostitutional 
and decriminalized.4
B. Discussion 
1. The Dilemma of Judicial Supremacy 
Position
Judicial supremacy in terms of constitutional 
interpretation only possible to occur if a judicial 
institution of a state was given a jurisdiction to 
enforce the constitution through a judicial review 
of an Act. Principally, not all of legal scholars 
are enthusiastic with the possibility of judicial 
1 Article 24C paragraph (1) the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.
2 See Fajar Laksono Soeroso, “Aspek Keadilan dalam Sifat Final Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi”, Jurnal Konstitusi, Vol. 11, No. 1, March 
2014, pp. 64-84.
3 Ibid., p. 83.
4 See Constitutional Court Decision No. 013-022/PUU-IV/2006 concerning review of Article 134,136 bis, 137 Criminal Code towards the 1945 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.
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supremacy. The main issues which commonly 
raised was the incompatibility of the practice 
with the democratic principles, in criticizing the 
practice of judicial review emerging from the 
Supreme Court of United States of America, a term 
of countermajoritarian difficulty appeared.5 This 
is actually a critic towards the danger of judicial 
supremacy in constitution interpretation through a 
judicial review of an Act, which considers being 
the opposite of the common belief (that a lawmaker 
who received mandate from the people). 
Theoretically, judicial supremacy is an 
implication from the judicial review institution. 
Therefore, judicial supremacy does not always 
happened in practice of judicial review6 The concept 
of judicial supremacy naturally has an understanding 
in the context of judicial review of an Act, “the 
Court defines effective constitutional meaning, such 
that other government officials are bound to adhere 
not only to the Court’s disposition of a specific case 
but also to the Court’s constitutional reasoning.”7
The guarantee of the judicial supremacy 
concept is the finality status of the decision in 
enforcing the constitution through a judicial review 
mechanism. The understanding can be referred to 
the opinion of Judge Robert Jackson, Supreme Court 
of United States of America, in the case of Brown v. 
Allen (1953) which stated: “We are not final because 
we are infallible, but we are infallible only because 
we are final.”8 Meaning that the Supreme Court 
decision is final because there are no other legal 
remedies available. Explaining the aforementioned 
statement in the context of judicial supremacy Keith 
E. Whittington said: “Judicial supremacy asserts 
that the Constitution is what the judges say it is, not 
because the Constitution has no objective meaning 
or that courts could not be wrong but because there 
is no alternative interpretive authority beyond the 
Court.”9 It can be concluded that with the lack of 
interpretative authority towards the constitution 
other than the judicial institution it could become 
an incentive for the practice of judicial supremacy. 
As mentioned, judicial supremacy is naturally 
concerning on the leadership in the constitutional 
interpretation as the context of judicial review 
practice.10 Whittington conceptualizes it with a 
term constitutional leadership.11 If formulated into a 
simple concept judicial supremacy naturally explicate 
about “Who is the most [...]? Or: Who should be in 
charge of constitution interpretation?”12 Thereby, 
the concept of judicial supremacy intrinsically 
conceive an implicit meaning that judicial institution 
is the front row of a constitution interpreter to lead 
the other governmental institutions in conducting 
constitution interpretation, determining the meaning 
of constitution in a monopolistic way in order to be 
a basis of government action in the future (and other 
core governmental institution, which is legislator 
or lawmaker, has to comply to the interpretation 
product).13
As comparison, the practice of judicial 
supremacy in the United States of America often 
got opposed even by legislator. Constitutionally, 
in relation with the validity of constitution 
interpretation by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, the Constitution of United States of America 
5 The term countermajoritarian difficulty found by Alexander M. Bickel which stated: “The root difficulty is that judicial review is 
countermajoritarian force in our system [...]. Not necessarily a meaningless or a pernicious one by any means; always charged with emotion, 
but nonrepresentational—an abstraction obscuring the reality that when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the 
action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf 
of the prevailing majority, but against it.” Alexander M. Bickel, 1986, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 
Second Edition, Yale University Press, New Haven, p. 16-17.
6 Titon Slamet Kurnia, 2013, Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia: Sang Penjaga HAM (The Guardian of Human Rights), Alumni, 
Bandung, pp. 135-136.
7 Keith E. Witthington, 2007, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The President, the Supreme Court and Constitutional Leadership 
in U.S. History, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, p. 7.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Titon Slamet Kurnia, Op.cit., p. 145.
11 Keith E. Whittington, Loc.cit.
12 Titon Slamet Kurnia, Loc.cit.
13 Ibid.
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does not gives explicit guarantee over its finality. 
This is different with Indonesia whereas the 
finality status of the Constitutional Court decision 
is explicitly guaranteed under the Indonesian 
Constitution of 1945. By this, in United States of 
America, the practice of judicial supremacy is tend 
to be unstable with a striking political background 
in relation between the Supreme Court and the 
Congress as legislator.14 One of the indication can 
be seen showed by the Supreme Court of United 
States of America in claiming that the legislator and 
other government institution in the United Stated of 
America should regard to its decisions. 
In the case of Cooper v. Aaron (1958), 
Supreme Court of the United States of America, 
Chief Justice Earl Warren stated:
This decision declared the basic principles 
that the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution, 
and that principle has ever since been 
respected by this Court and the Country as 
a permanent and indispensable feature of 
our constitutional system. It follows that the 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is 
the supreme law of the land.15
The statement of the Supreme Court in the 
case of Cooper v. Aaron gives a hint that judicial 
supremacy is important in order to enforce the 
constitutional supremacy into all of the government 
institutions. To establish constitution supremacy, 
it is necessary for judicial institution as the 
interpreter to get guaranteed over its supremacy, 
thus the constitution interpretation could bind other 
government institutions.16
Historically, the case of Cooper v. Aaron was 
interesting due to its background of disobedience 
towards the Supreme Court decisions in the case 
of Brown v. Board of Education (1954) initiated 
by Orval Faubus, the Governor of Arkansas. The 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education case is 
greatly significance in the United States of America, 
the decision orders the abolition of racial segregation 
practice which quite sensitive in the United States. 
In the opposition Faubus claimed that “the Supreme 
Court decision is not the law of the land” which 
makes the policy on racial desegregation in public 
schools as an implication of Brown v. Board of 
Education decision was not bound. 17
The Supreme Court of the United States’ 
position in the case of Cooper v. Aaron is quite 
fair, which to give a right response towards 
the opposition of Brown v. Board of Education 
decision, which contain fundamental constitutional 
principles. The rationale of fairness from such 
position can be seen from the opinion mentioned 
by Whittington as follows: “The Constitution 
cannot be maintained as a coherent law unless the 
Court serves as its ‘ultimate interpreter’, whose 
understandings of the constitutional text supersede 
any others and which other government officials 
are required to adopt.”18 Although, in the context of 
the United States’ constitution, such opinion does 
not have an explicit constitutional basis, rather 
only a construction of logical thoughts inferentially 
connected to the function of the Supreme Court of 
United States in enforcing the constitution whereas 
the interpretation product should be adhere by the 
government institutions in the hope that there will 
be coherence between constitution with laws under 
it. 
Opposition towards Brown v. Board of 
Education as well as the response of the Supreme 
Court of United States through Cooper v. Aaron 
decision would not be happened if the finality of 
its decisions was guaranteed by the constitution, 
as the Constitutional Court. Meaning that to 
14 This matter will further discuss by the author in the next section from this article concerning the practice of Congressional Overrides, which 
position the practice of the United States of America as a comparison to reconstruct the ideas that will be implemented in the relation of 
legislator and the MK in Indonesia. 
15 Keith E. Whittington, Op.cit., p. 2-3.
16 Titon Slamet Kurnia, Op.cit., p. 147.
17 Keith E. Whittington, Op.cit., p. 11.
18 Ibid., p. 4.
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get into the position of judicial supremacy, the 
Supreme Court of United State should fight for its 
authority as constitution interpreter when facing the 
disobedience of other government institutions. In 
that kind of context the author rather questioning the 
position of the Constitutional Court which relatively 
to be more established than the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Whether with the guarantee given 
over its decisions, the other institutions especially 
legislator must comply with the constitution 
interpretation product made by the Constitutional 
Court? As promised, the focus of this article will be 
on re-interpretation of the finality of Constitutional 
Court decisions in terms of judicial review of an 
Act as well as a re-design over the understanding 
of finality in its connection with the institutional 
relationship between the Constitutional Court and 
legislator. The most important thing here is the 
position of the Constitutional Court when facing the 
legislator as a democratic decision maker in a form 
of an Act. If Indonesia recognized as democratic 
state the existence of the Constitutional Court will 
be mutatis mutandis similar as the Supreme Court 
of the United States where Alexander M. Bickel 
have been assertively stated that “judicial review is 
a deviant institution in the American democracy.”19
2. Congressional Overrides
The perspectives that oppose practice of 
judicial supremacy in constitution interpretation 
represented by Thomas Jefferson, the President of 
the United States of America, initiating the concept 
of departmentalism. Explaining Thomas Jefferson’s 
concept of departmentalism, Whittington stated: 
the Jeffersonian idea that each branch of 
government has an equal authority and 
responsibility to interpret the Constitution 
when performing its own duties [...]. For the 
departmentalist, the Court’s interpretations 
of the Constitution might be persuasive 
or adequate, but the Court has no special 
institutional authority to say what the 
Constitution means. The judiciary is one 
institution among many that is trying to get 
the Constitution right, but the other branches 
of government have no responsibility to take 
the Court’s reading of the Constitution as 
being the same as the Constitution itself.20
Departmentalism concept put government 
institutions, including judicial institution in the 
equal position of function and authority in regards 
to constitution interpretation. Therefore the 
interpretation product made by judicial institution 
was only being regarded as persuasive measure by 
other government institutions.21
In conceptual theory, the judicial review 
institution can be seen as a solution for the problem 
of absolutism that potentially arises by the practice 
of parliament supremacy. Jeffrey Goldsworthy 
explain the nature of parliament supremacy as 
follows: 
Every statute that Parliament enacts is 
legally valid, and therefore that all citizens 
and officials, including the courts, are 
legally obligated to obey it. The courts’ legal 
obligation is therefore to interpret and apply 
every statute in a way that is consistent with 
Parliament’s legal authority to enact it, and 
their corresponding obligation to obey it.22
The judicial review institution situated in the 
opposite point of parliament supremacy. Thereby, 
from one opposite end to the other opposite end is a 
highly dangerous solution.
In one of Thomas Jefferson’s letter that 
addressed to Abigail Adams, he explicitly express 
his criticism on the implication of judicial review of 
an Act towards legislator as follows: “The opinion 
which gives to judges the right to decide what 
laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for 
themselves in their own sphere of action, but for 
the Legislature and Executive also, would make the 
judiciary a despotic branch.”23 Legislator tyranny 
(with parliament supremacy) replaced with judicial 
19 Alexander M. Bickel, Op.cit., p. 18.
20 Keith E. Whittington, Op.cit., p. xii.
21 Titon Slamet Kurnia, Op.cit., p. 150.
22 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 2010, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 225.
23 Andrew Altman, 2010, Arguing about Law, Wadsworth Publishing Co., Belmont-California, pp. 84-85.
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tyranny (with judicial supremacy) it is clearly not 
an ideal constitutional situation if assessed from the 
perspective of constitutionalism principles. Both of 
the extreme opposite points, problems and solution, 
should be assesed in depth. The assessment was 
unfortunately missed in the third amendment of the 
1945 Constitution which one of the purposes was 
to initiate the Constitutional Court.24 The logical 
implication which later arise, but never been thought 
before was the potential of judicial supremacy by 
the Constitutional Court that is hard to reconcile 
with the constitutionalism principles.
Charles Howard McIlwain explain that the 
concept of constitutionalism contain the meaning 
of antithesis despotic/arbitrary government, which 
is: “in all its successive phases, constitutionalism 
has one essential quality: it is a legal limitation on 
government; it is the antithesis of arbitrary rule; its 
opposite is despotic government, the government 
of will instead of law.”25 Further McIlwain stated 
that two fundamental elements from the concept of 
constitutionalism are: “the legal limits to arbitrary 
power and a complete political responsibility of 
government to the governed.”26 The potential 
of judicial supremacy in terms of constitution 
interpretation done by the Constitutional Court is 
broadly open, because one if its pre-conditions has 
been fulfilled, which is the guarantee over the finality 
of its decisions. In one hand, the guarantee given by 
the Constitution gives a strong juridical implication 
as a limitation of the legislative authority hold by 
the House of Representative and the President. 
Yet in the other hand it creates another problem, 
because there are no available legal remedies over A 
Constitutional Court decisions. Due to that reasons, 
the constitution interpretation by the Constitutional 
Court has fulfilled the requirements to be categorized 
as parallel with the concept of judicial supremacy 
because in accordance with Whittington’s opinion: 
“the Constitution is what the judges say it is, not 
because the Constitution has no objective meaning 
or that courts could not be wrong but because there 
is no alternative interpretive authority beyond the 
Court.”
With such tendency the author hardly deny 
Thomas Jefferson’s belief that jurisdiction of judicial 
review can reformed a judicial institution to be “a 
despotic branch” that contradicts with the principles 
of constitutionalism. This is where the relevance of 
departmentalism in answering problems concerning 
judicial review institution with the relation between 
judicial institution (the Constitutional Court) which 
has judicial review jurisdiction and the legislator 
(the House of Representative and the President) 
which the legislative product being put as an 
object of reviewed. Consistent with the common 
understanding, problems that arise along with the 
concept of judicial supremacy is the needs of control 
over judicial institution.27 In accordance with the 
opinion of Thomas Jefferson, departmentalism 
gives the opportunity to conduct checks and 
balances equally amongst government institutions 
as the logic of constitutional-democratic. 
Correspondingly, as a comparison, the 
practice of Congressional Overrides in the 
United States can be referred to in constructing a 
theoretical framework that is more sufficient to 
understand future institutional relation between the 
Constitutional Court and the legislator concerning 
the authority of government institution to conduct 
constitution interpretation.28 Before going into 
further specific on the practice of Congressional 
Overrides, the author will first explain about the 
underlying framework. Congressional Overrides is 
a response over the institutional position of a judicial 
institution that has countermajoritarian difficulty 
24 Titon Slamet Kurnia, Op.cit., pp. 117-120.
25 Charles Howard McIlwain, 1947, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern, Cornell University Press, New York-Ithaca, pp. 21-22.
26 Ibid., p. 146.
27 Barry Friedman, “The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy”, New York University Law 
Review, Vol. 73, 1998, p. 354.
28 i.e. in relation with the present debate concerning R-KUHP that is going to re-criminalized defamation towards the President or the Vice 
President which has been decriminalized by the MK due to inconstitutional reason. 
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regarding its relation with the legislative institution. 
The practice of Congressional Overrides describes 
as an effort by the legislative institution to check 
over the judicial institution.29 The Congressional 
Overrides itself naturally means a disagreement 
of the Congress over a constitution interpretation 
made by the Supreme Court through its decisions. 
The focus of the Congress in conducting overrides 
is the involvement of judicial institution in the 
policy-making or judicial-law-making that lessen 
the legislative power in its hand. The practice of 
overrides itself naturally an effort to overcome 
countermajoritarian difficulty faced by judicial 
institution.30 The practice of overrides including 
“passing a new statute or amending an existing 
statute.”31 The implication of such action is to annul 
the decision of the Supreme Court as long as it is in 
regards to the enforceability of an Act. 
According to William N. Eskridge, Jr., the 
practice of Congressional Overrides commonly 
pursued in the situation “when a Supreme Court 
interpretation reveals an ideologically fragmented 
Court, relies on the text’s plain meaning and ignores 
legislative signals, and/or rejects positions taken 
by federal, state, or local governments.”32 In line 
with that argument, overrides done by the Congress 
seems to be in the spirit of checks and balances, 
especially as the corrective measure towards a 
Supreme Court decisions which deemed to be not 
correct by the Congress. 
Congressional Overrides can also be done 
in a form of constitution amendment. Although, 
such kind of mechanism is rarely done. Historically 
there are several practices of overrides that is done 
through constitution amendment. First, Chisholm v. 
Georgia (1793) case. This case is about the Supreme 
Court of United States decision that receives a 
claim from foreign nationality citizen towards the 
state of Georgia. This decision was overrides by the 
XI Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States of America, which stated: “The judicial 
power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 
or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of 
any foreign State.” Second, Dred Scott v. Sandford 
(1857) case. This case is about the omission over 
right to claim by Dred Scott an African-American 
former slave that claims for protection under equal 
protection clause. This decision was overrides with 
the XIII Amendment of the Constitution of United 
States of America, which stated: “Neither slavery 
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment 
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or 
any place subject to their jurisdiction” and the XIV 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
of America stated: “All persons born or naturalized 
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States [...]”.
Third, Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. 
(1895) case. This case is about the decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States that decides that 
the Congress’ Act, which made uniformity on income 
tax, was unconstitutional. This case was overrides 
with the XVI Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States of America, which stated: “The 
Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, 
without apportionment among the several States, 
and without regard to any census or enumeration.” 
Fourth, Oregon v. Mitchell (1970) case. This case 
is about the Supreme Court decision that decided 
the unconstitutionality of Congress’ Act, which is 
the Voting Rights Act (1970), concerning regulation 
of voting rights for the citizen of age 18 years 
old in the regional state election. This Act lowers 
29 Deborah A. Widiss, “Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides”, Notre Dame 
Law Review, Vol. 84, 2009, pp. 513-514.
30 Ibid., pp. 519-520.
31 Ibid., p. 520.
32 William N. Eskridge, Jr., “Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 101, 1991, p. 334.
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the citizen’s age requirements of 21 years old to 
have voting rights into 18 years old for federal or 
regional state election. This case was overrides with 
the XXVI Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States of America, which stated: “The right 
of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen 
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of age.”33
While override cases in a form of highly 
significant Act was a response of the Congress and 
the legislative institution of regional state towards 
the decision made by the Supreme Court of the 
United States regarding the abolition of capital 
punishment in the Criminal Act. In Furman v. 
Georgia (1972) case, the Supreme Court of United 
States gives greatly progressive decision, which 
stated that capital punishment is unconstitutional 
due to the reason that it was a practice of cruel and 
unusual punishment so that its existence in the Act 
was violating VIII Amendment of the Constitution 
of the United States of America. As the implication 
from the Furman v. Georgia case, all of federal Act 
and regional state Act that contain capital punishment 
is revoked by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.34 This decision was opposed by the majority 
of regional states and federal government which 
gives opposite opinion that the capital punishment 
does not always be cruel and unusual. Thirty-five of 
regional states and federal government “revive” the 
capital punishment by “passing new death penalty 
laws with added procedural safeguards to protect 
against arbitrary and capricious executions.”35
Towards that particular situation the Supreme 
Court of United States does not give a negative 
response by defending their arguments in Furman 
v. Georgia decision and actually annulled the 
overrides. In the contrary the Supreme Court of 
the United States understand the override set out 
for them in the Furman v. Georgia decision. Judge 
Stewart delivered the perspective of the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Gregg v. Georgia 
(1976) decision, which stated: 
Despite the continuing debate, dating back to 
the 19th century, over the morality and utility 
of capital punishment, it is now evident 
that a large proportion of American society 
continues to regard it as an appropriate and 
necessary criminal sanction. The most marked 
indication of society’s endorsement of the 
death penalty for murder is the legislative 
response to Furman. The legislatures of at 
least 35 States have enacted new statutes that 
provide for the death penalty for at least some 
crimes that result in the death of another 
person. And the Congress of the United 
States, in 1974, enacted a statute providing 
the death penalty for aircraft piracy that 
results in death.36
Further, in this case the Supreme Court of the 
United States also acknowledge the constitutionality 
of capital punishment in the new Criminal Act as 
an override over the Furman v. Georgia decision 
with the phrase of “capital punishment laws as 
being constitutional so long as adequate additional 
procedural safeguards were afforded to capital 
punishment litigants.”37
The aforementioned practice describes a 
healthy constitutional dialog in the process of 
constitution interpretation between the Supreme 
Court of the United States and the legislative power 
and the regional states who is done the override. 
Such practice should function to prevent rivalry 
between judicial institution which has a judicial 
review authority with the legislator whereas 
each claiming the supremacy of one another. 
Additionally, such practice could also avoid the 
judicial institution from critical allegations about 
its countermajoritarian position also as deviant 
institution in a democratic country (Alexander M. 
Bickel).
33 Titon Slamet Kurnia, Op.cit., pp. 169-170.
34 Steven G. Calabresi, “The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent and Burke”, Alabama Law Review, Vol. 57, 2006, p. 664.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., pp. 664-665.
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Theoretically, the legitimation of the 
judicial review institution can be dependent with 
the righteousness of its constitution interpretation 
product. Therefore a mistake could result a very 
serious problem for the legitimacy of its existence.38 
In the thoughts of judicial review, one of the reasons 
to gives such a big authority to the judicial institution 
is its institutional character which hardly function as 
tyrant for the citizen (the least dangerous branch). 
Alexander Hamilton who wrote in Federalist No. 78 
gave the belief as follows: 
Whoever attentively considers the different 
departments of power must perceive, that in a 
government in which they are separated from 
each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its 
functions, will always be the least dangerous 
to the political rights of the constitution; 
because it will be least in a capacity to 
annoy or injure them. The executive not only 
dispenses the honors, but holds the sword 
of the community. The legislature not only 
commands the purse, but prescribes the 
rules by which the duties and rights of every 
citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary on 
the contrary has no influence over either the 
sword or the purse, no direction either of the 
strength or of the wealth of the society, and 
can take no active resolution whatever. It may 
truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, 
but merely judgment; and must ultimately 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm 
even for the efficacy of its judgments.39
However, Altman shows the weakness of 
Hamilton argument: “there are few democratic 
controls on a Court that is abusing its power.”40 
Altman’s critics in contradicts from the assumption 
that even though it is less dangerous but the judicial 
institution also capable in doing abuse of power 
which make it possible to become tyranny for the 
other government institution or citizens.41 Here 
where the relevance of Thomas Jefferson ideas of 
departmentalism connected with the judicial review 
of an Act. Departmentalism relativize dominant 
position of judicial institution in conducting judicial 
review as well as giving a room of participation 
for the legislator in order to conduct constitution 
interpretation. This is a highly positive in order 
to prevent a misunderstanding over the judicial 
institution in constitution interpretation so that 
mistakes can be corrected by the legislator. 
3. Re-interpretation of the Constitutional 
Court’s Decision Finality 
Indonesia is different United States of 
America. The existence of the Constitutional Court 
as a constitution judiciary with jurisdiction, to 
conduct judicial review of an Act cannot be equalized 
with the practice done by the Supreme Court of the 
United States based on Marbury v. Madison (1803) 
case. One of the principal differences between both 
of the system is the guarantee in the attribution of 
judicial review authority as well as the finality status 
of its decision. Therefore the Constitutional Court’s 
position is way stronger compare to the Supreme 
Court of the United States in its relation with the 
legislator. However, this becomes a problem. The 
Constitutional Court’s position that is way too 
strong can become incentive for bigger judicial 
supremacy practice. This condition is not desired if 
the product of constitution interpretation contains 
error because there are no available legal remedies 
towards the Constitutional Court decision. Hence, 
the needs of comparison approach with the practice 
in the United States of America that hopefully can 
give institutional insight to solve the problems. 
Thoughts or conception that the author try 
to develop is that even though constitutionally the 
Constitutional Court’s decision is final, nevertheless, 
in the framework of departmentalism, its position 
as suggested by Thomas Jefferson: “the other 
branches of government have no responsibility 
to take the Court’s reading of the Constitution as 
being the same as the Constitution itself.” What 
should be underlined in the previous statement is 
38 Based on the idea that the professional capacity as interpreter for judicial institution become one of the consideration in giving the judicial 
review authority. Titon Slamet Kurnia, Op.cit., pp. 85-96.
39 Alexander Hamilton, et al., 2003, The Federalist with Letters of Brutus (Terence Ball ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 378.
40 Andrew Altman, Op.cit., p. 88.
41 Ibid.
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that the finality of the Constitutional Court decision 
in judicial review is prima facie and it does not 
give obligation for the legislator to comply to such 
decision nor absolutely bound by the Constitutional 
Court constitution interpretation as well as the 
implication of the decision. Such ideas should be 
interpreted as inherent principles in Indonesia’s 
constitutional system based on the Indonesian 
Constitution of 1945 which has commitment 
towards checks and balances to be conduct equally 
among the exists core government institutions, 
particularly between the Constitutional Court and 
legislator. 
Even though, the aforementioned ideas is 
not explicitly supported under the constitution, yet 
the ideas should always be acknowledge within 
the constitutional system which based on strong 
commitment towards checks and balances in terms 
to guarantee the healthy constitutionalism, which 
is the non-existence of serious rivalry between 
legislator and the Constitutional Court. In such 
context the substantive argument to justify the 
ideas is that Indonesian constitutional system to 
be more based on constitutional supremacy rather 
than parliament supremacy or judicial supremacy. 
To enforce the constitutional supremacy so there 
will be neither parliament supremacy nor judicial 
supremacy. What exist are the checks and balances 
to support constitutional supremacy. Errors in 
constitution interpretation by the legislator or 
lawmaker will be corrected by the Constitutional 
Court through judicial review. Therefore it is only 
logical to apply a contrario formula that an error 
in constitution interpretation by the Constitutional 
Court could also be corrected by the legislator 
through overrides. 
Based on the spirit of checks and balances, the 
finality of the Constitutional Court decision should 
be seen prima facie. This does not explicitly states 
in the Indonesian Constitution of 1945, but can be 
refer to the system of the Indonesian Constitutional 
of 1945. The author believes, departmentalism as 
set out by Thomas Jefferson can obtain a place 
in Indonesia constitutional system to answer the 
aforementioned problem without the need for it 
to be explicitly regulated. Principally an argument 
can be build that incorrectness cannot bound and 
applies as rules for other people. It rather should 
be corrected. Here is the importance of position 
in departmentalism and even more, Congressional 
Overrides to be institutionalized as constitutional 
through constitutional convention. 
The author contends that the judicial review 
conducted by the Constitutional Court should not 
be interpreted as zero-sum game situation. The 
judicial review should open a room for dialogue and 
deliberation between the Constitutional Court and 
the legislator, specifically to establish a dialectic 
process in order to achieve the righteousness of 
constitutional. The judicial supremacy position 
does not suitable with the principle of constitutional 
supremacy, remembering that the constitution 
interpretation products made by the Constitutional 
Court has an inherent potential to contain errors. 
This is an extremely serious problem because 
institutionally the Constitutional Court faced by 
countermajoritarian difficulty situation. 
Thus, judicial supremacy position could only 
be justified in the extreme situation. A situation 
that result the practice of judicial supremacy is 
legitimately explicit constitution violation by 
legislator in making laws, such as Human Rights 
violation. This is in line with Tom Ginsburg 
thoughts that justified judicial review, using the 
argument of: “judicial review can ensure that 
minorities remain part of the system, bolster 
legitimacy, and save democracy from itself.”42 The 
inability of the minority to protect the fundamental 
interest in democratic dispute from the majority 
has to be compensate by the presence of judicial 
review institution as the form of warranty so that 
the minority’s interests is not sacrificed in the name 
of majority’s interests. With that kind of theoretical 
framework Ginsburg appreciates the judicial review 
42 Tom Ginsburg, 2003, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
p. 22.
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as constitution that countermajoritarian in the 
positive sense, which is: “judicial review may be 
countermajoritarian but is not counterdemocratic.”43
In accordance with the departmentalism to 
re-interpret the finality status of the Constitutional 
Court decision, the practice of overrides done by the 
legislator towards the Constitutional Court decision 
will need an opportunity, especially as the corrective 
measure in response to the error of the Constitutional 
Court interpretation in its decisions. In order that the 
practice of override would not be arbitrarily done, 
the reasoning should be more convincing compare 
to the Constitutional Court decision. A contrario 
legislator should convincingly shows that there is 
a substantial error from the Constitutional Court 
decision and the error cannot be left as is, but should 
be corrected. The Constitutional Court decision that 
is divided, which with a simpler majority (5/4), is a 
strong signal for the legislator to do overrides with 
a base that the Constitutional Court itself does not 
have a strong ground belief in its decision over the 
issue of constitutionality over an Act. 
While in practice, legislator themselves had 
done override towards the Constitutional Court 
decision. The practice was done in the response 
towards the Constitutional Court decision on the 
judicial review of an Act concerning State Budget 
(APBN) based on Article 31 paragraph (4) of 
Indonesian Constitution of 1945 about the allocation 
of 20% of the state budget for education.44 Other 
than that, in avoiding the high-tension of rivalry 
with the legislator, the practice of judicial review 
by the Constitutional Court have a tendency 
towards departmentalism by acknowledging the 
open legislative policy from legislator and making 
constitution decision with conditions.45 It can be 
concluded that the practice of constitutionalism 
in Indonesia, subconsciously accommodate 
departmentalism approach concerning the 
constitution interpretation, particularly in relation 
between the Constitutional Court and the legislator. 
C. Conclusion
Indonesian Constitution of 1945, have a 
strong commitment towards checks and balances in 
order to guarantee the realization of constitutional 
supremacy. Although the finality status of the 
Constitutional Court decision is guaranteed cons titu-
tionally, that does not preclude the oppor tunity for 
constitutional dialog in accordance with departmen-
talism approach. To result the constitutional 
righteousness in terms of constitution interpretation, 
dialogue between the Constitutional Court and the 
legislator will be needed. In such position the finality 
status of the Constitutional Court decision under 
Indonesian Constitution of 1945 becomes prima 
facie and not absolute. Additionally, the practice of 
overrides by the legislator can be institutionalized 
through the process of constitution convention. 
The decision will later be depend on the legislator, 
whether they going to response to the Constitutional 
Court decision by doing overrides or not.
43 Ibid., p. 31. Compare with Edward Rubin, “Judicial Review and the Right to Resist”, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 97, 2008, p. 103. Rubin 
qualifies that the character of countermajoritarian of the judicial review institution is not antidemocrary, but antirepresentational.
44 Dialogis process between legislator and the MK in relation with the implementation of Article 31 paragraph (4) of Indonesina Constitution 
of 1945 in the State Budget is very dinamic. See Decision No. 012/PUU-III/2005 (review on Act No. 36 of 2004 concerning State Budget in 
2006); Decision No. 026/PUU-IV/2006 (review on Act No. 18 of 2006 concerning State Revenue and State Budget of 2007); Decision No. 
13/PUU-VI/2008 (review on Act No.16 in 2008 concerning Amendment of Act No. 45 of 2007 concerning State Revenue and State Budget in 
2008).Titon Slamet Kurnia, Op.cit., p. 171.
45 Concerning the interpretation of the MK decision with condition see Simon Butt, “Conditional Constitutionality, Pragmatism and the Rule of 
Law”, Legal Studies Research Paper – Sydney Law School, No. 09/28, 2009. 
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